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Abstract
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where
agents may decide on an action in a 2 £ 2- coordination game and on whom to establish
costly links to. We ¯nd that a payo® dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter
range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario
where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result
is that constrained interactions create a tradeo® between the interactions an agent has and
those he would rather have. Further, we discuss convex linking costs and provide su±cient
conditions for the payo® dominant convention to be selected in m£ m coordination games.
Keywords: Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Learning, Network Formation.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: C72, D83.
1 Introduction
In many situations people can bene¯t from coordinating on the same action. Typical exam-
ples include common technology standards (e.g. Blue-ray Disc vs. HD DVD), the choice of a
telecommunication provider in the presence of discriminatory pricing, the choice of common
legal standards (e.g. driving on the left versus the right side of the road), or a common social
norm (e.g. the a±rmative versus the disapproving meaning of shaking one's head in di®erent
parts of the world.) These situations give rise to coordination games with multiple strict Nash
equilibria.
A broad range of global and local interaction models (see e.g. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
(1993), Young (1993), Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993, 2000), or Al¶ os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer
(2007)) ¯nds that in coordination games (potentially) ine±cient risk dominant conventions will
emerge in the long run when agents use myopic best response rules and occasionally make
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1mistakes.1 The main reason behind this result is that risk dominant strategies perform well in
a world of uncertainty, where there is the possibility of coordination error, and will eventually
take over the entire population.
In the present paper, we present a model where agents in addition to their action choice in
a 2 £ 2 coordination game may directly choose the set of their opponents.2 We model this by
assuming that agents decide on whom to maintain (costly) links to, thereby giving rise to a
model of non-cooperative network formation µ a la Bala and Goyal (2000). Our main analysis
turns around the comparison of two scenarios.
In our ¯rst scenario, which is a slight modi¯cation of Goyal and Vega-Redondo's (2005)
model, we discuss the case when agents may in principle support links to everybody in the
population. In line with Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005), we ¯nd that for relatively low costs
of link formation the risk dominant complete network is selected whereas for relatively high costs
of link formation the payo® dominant convention is selected. The main reason for this result is
that if costs are low agents obtain a positive payo® from linking to other players irrespective
of their strategy. Hence, the complete network will always form and we are basically back in
the framework of global interactions where the risk dominant strategy is uniquely selected. If
costs of forming links are however high agents may not want to support links to agents using a
di®erent strategy, which renders the advantage of the risk dominant strategy obsolete.
In our second scenario we discuss a setting where agents may only maintain a limited number
of links.3 The underlying idea is that in many situations the set of interaction partners a typical
economic agent is linked to is fairly small compared to the overall population.4 For instance,
there is hardly anybody who is linked to everybody on facebook. In this constrained link
scenario agents will have to carefully decide on whom to establish a link to. In this sense,
constrained interactions create a tradeo® between the links an agent has and those he would
rather have. This in turn implies that if there is a (relatively) small number of agents choosing
the payo® dominant strategy all agents will want to establish links with those agents and switch
to (or remain at) the payo® dominant action. On the contrary, it becomes very di±cult to leave
the payo® dominant convention as it will always spread back from a relatively small number of
agents using it. This creates a fairly strong force allowing agents to reach e±cient outcomes.
In the present paper we provide a full characterization of the set of long run outcomes
depending on the cost of link formation and on the number of links agents may support. We
show that regardless of the costs of link formation the payo® dominant convention is selected
1See Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) and Al¶ os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) for local interaction
models showing that imitation learning may lead to e±cient outcomes.
2See also Jackson and Watts (2002) and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005), or Hojman and Szeidl (2006).
3The implications of such a setting have already been discussed by Jackson and Watts (2002) in a model
where action- and link- choice are not simultaneous (see the discussion below.)
4See e.g. Goyal, van der Leij, and Moraga-Gonzalez (2006) who study the coauthor network in economics and
¯nd that on average economists have less than two coauthors. Further, note that in small world networks the
number of links supported by individual agents is also small, (see e.g. Watts and Strogatz (1998)).
2if agents may only support relatively few links. In contrast, we ¯nd that the risk dominant
convention is only selected if agents may support many links and the costs of link formation are
low. Interestingly, we ¯nd that if agents may only support links to less than half of the overall
population the payo® dominant convention will always be selected. The main reason behind
this insight is that moving into the basin of attraction of the payo® dominant convention takes
less than half of the population to switch whereas leaving the basin of attraction of the payo®
dominant convention takes more than half.
We further provide two extensions to our model. First, we consider a setting where the costs
of link formation are convex in the number of links. In this setting the number of links an agent
maximally supports arises endogenously. Here we ¯nd that if the costs of link formation are
\high" so that agents will not link to everybody in the population the payo® dominant con-
vention is selected whereas for relatively low linking costs agents will link to everybody in the
population and the selection of the risk dominant convention remains. Further, as a robustness
check of our model, we revisit the (exogenously) constrained linking scenario, to show that in
fact payo® dominant conventions will be selected in general m£m coordination games if agents
interact with less than half of the population.
The present work is closely related to the recent literature on social coordination and network
formation (see Jackson and Watts (2002), Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005), and Hojman and
Szeidl (2006)). As in the present paper, in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) and Hojman and
Szeidl (2006)5 agents may unilaterally decide on whom to maintain links to. In Jackson and
Watts (2002) the consent of both parties is needed to form a link, which stipulates the use of
Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) concept of pairwise stability. However, the crucial di®erence
between the ¯rst approach and the second approach is that in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005)
and Hojman and Szeidl (2006) agents may change strategies and links at the same time whereas
in Jackson and Watts (2002) an updating agent may either decide on his action or on a link.
The only di®erence between our unconstrained link scenario and the work by Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2005) is that in their paper the payo® received by agents is on both sides (the
active and the passive one) of the link whereas in our setup the payo® is only on the active side.6
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) shortly discuss the implications of having only active links and
put forward the interpretation of such a network as peer network, i.e. a network where in°uence
is uni-directional and if k regards j as his peer than j need not be in in°uenced by the action
of k. Jackson and Watts (2002) show that for low linking costs the risk dominant convention is
5The setup of Hojman and Szeidl (2006) is very similar to the one of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005). The
payo® structure of their model extends to a situations where agents also obtain payo®s form path connected
agents.
6Qualitatively, our results are the same, though. The main di®erence lies in the magnitude of the thresholds
for equilibrium selection we identify. See also the discussion in the extensions section of Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2005).
3selected whereas for high linking costs the payo® dominant and the risk dominant convention
are selected. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) demonstrate that the fact that Jackson and
Watts' (2002) model does not uniquely select the payo® dominant strategy for high linking
costs is inherent in the assumption that agents may not choose links and actions in the base
game at the same time. In particular, the nature of transition from one convention to another
is di®erent. In Jackson and Watts (2002) this transition is stepwise: starting with a connected
component of size two other players mutating will join one-by-one and we gradually reach the
other convention, whereas in Goyal and Vega-Redondo's (2005) model and in the present paper,
once a su±ciently large number of players plays one action all other players will immediately
follow.
Jackson and Watts (2002) also discuss the implications of constrained interactions in their
model. They do however not ¯nd any relevant e®ect of constrained interactions on the pre-
dictions of their model (with of course the exception being the number of links agents form).
The reason why constrained links do not play an important role lies again in the assumption
that agents may not adjust actions and links at the same time, thereby giving rise again to a
step-by-step transition from one convention to another.
A di®erent branch in the literature has presented us with models where agents in addition
to their strategy choice may choose among several locations where the game is played (see e.g.
Oechssler (1997, 1999) Dieckmann (1999), Ely (2002), or Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2004)).
In these models, the most likely scenario will be the emergence of payo® dominant conventions.
The reason behind this result is that agents using risk dominant strategies may no longer prompt
their interaction partners to switch strategies but instead to simply move away. In this sense,
agents can vote by their feet which allows them to coordinate at e±cient outcomes.
If, however, one is prepared to identify free mobility with low linking costs, this leaves
a puzzle to explain: Ely (2002) selects the payo® dominant convention, while in Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2005) and in our unconstrained interactions the risk dominant convention is
selected. The main reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that Ely (2002) considers average
payo®s whereas Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) and we consider additive payo®s.7 In the
framework of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) and in our unconstrained interactions scenario
the additive payo® structure implies that all links are valuable for su±ciently low linking costs,
giving rise to the risk dominant convention. On the contrary, in Ely's (2002) model the number
of potential opponents does not matter and players will always prefer to interact with a small
number of players choosing the payo® dominant strategy than with a large number choosing
the ine±cient strategy. Note that in our constrained links scenario a similar mechanism is at
work. If the number of permitted links is relatively small only a small fraction of agents using
7Ely (2002) also considers a variation with an additive payo® structure. He shows that there exists a parameter
region such that the risk dominant strategy is selected. In addition, he shows in Theorem 2 that the simultaneous
choice of locations and actions is essential for the selection of the e±cient convention.
4the payo® dominant action will prompt other agents to link up with them and switch to the
payo® dominant action.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses the
techniques used. In Section 3 we present our main results. Section 4 spells out two extensions
of the model and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
2.1 The game
Our model is set in the following environment. We consider a set I of agents with jIj = N who
play a 2£2 symmetric coordination game against each other. In addition to choosing an action
in the coordination game agents can decide on the set of their interaction partners.
Each player i can choose an action ai 2 fA;Bg in the coordination game. We denote by
u(ai;aj) the payo® agent i receives from interacting with agent j. The following table describes




We assume that the payo®s satisfy the following ordering:
b > a > c > d > 0
Note that as a > d and b > c we have that both, (A;A) and (B;B), are strict Nash equilibria,
NE, where the latter is Pareto-dominant. Further, we assume that
a + c > d + b
so that the equilibrium (A;A) is risk dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), i.e. A




a ¡ d + b ¡ c
denote the critical mass placed on A in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that risk dominance
of (A;A) translates into q¤ < 1
2.
We assume that in addition to their choice in the coordination game agents can decide on
whom to link to. If player i forms a link to player j we write gij = 1 and we write gij = 0 if
player i decides not to form a link to player j. We assume that players may not be linked to
5themselves, i.e. gii = 0 for all i 2 I. The linking decision of agent i can be summarized by the
n-tuple gi = (gi1;gi2;:::;gin) 2 Gi = f0;1gn where gii is always zero. We denote by g = (gi)i2I
the network induced by the link decisions of all agents. A pure strategy of an agent consists
of her action choice in the coordination game, ai 2 fA;Bg, and of her linking decisions, i.e.
si = (ai;gi) 2 Si = fA;Bg £ Gi. A strategy pro¯le is a tuple s = (si)i2I 2
Q
i2I Si = S. For
a given strategy pro¯le s we denote by n(s) the number of A-players given strategy pro¯le s.
Conversely, the number of B-players under strategy pro¯le s is given by N ¡ n(s). We denote
by N(i) = fj 2 Ijgij = 1g the set of neighbors of an agent i, i.e. the set of agents agent i has
established a link to. We refer to the number di = jN(i)j =
P
j gij as the out-degree of player i.
We assume that the payo® of an agent is given by the sum of payo®s she receives from
interacting with each of her neighbors minus a cost incurred from linking up to these neighbors.
In particular, we assume that the cost of linking to di other agents is given by the cost function





Note that, in contrast to Jackson and Watts's (2002) model of two sided links, in our model
the link decision of agents is unilateral, i.e. it does not take the consent of the other party to
form a link. Thus, the networks arising in our model are directed graphs. Further, note that we
also assume that the payo® from interaction is only on the active side.8 Note that this implies
that the action of the active party does not in°uence the payo® of the passive party. Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2005) put forward the interpretation of such networks as a model of peer
groups and fashion, where asymmetric °ow of in°uence seems a natural feature.
A model of one sided links has the advantage that the passive party does not bene¯t nor
su®er from a link and thus has no incentives to reject it. If (negative) payo® was also generated
on the passive side then the passive side should also have the possibility to terminate a link,
giving rise to a model of two sided passive links.
2.2 Learning
We consider a model of noisy best response learning in discrete time µ a la Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993), Young (1993). Each period t = 0;1;2;::: an agent receives the opportunity to
update her strategy with independent probability ¸ 2 (0;1). When such a revision opportunity
arises we assume that each agent chooses a strategy (i.e. an action in the base game and the set
8This is actually the only di®erence to the setup chosen by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005). In fact Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2005) shortly discuss a model of one sided active links in their extensions section.
6of agents she links to) that would have maximized her payo® in the previous period.9;10 More
formally, in period t agent i chooses
si(t) 2 arg max
si2Si
Ui(si;s¡i(t ¡ 1))
where s¡i(t¡1) is the strategy pro¯le used by all other agents except i in the previous period.
If multiple strategies are suggested by the adjustment process we assume that agents choose
one at random. We refer to this adjustment process as the unperturbed process.
With independent probability " 2 (0;1) the updating agent ignores the prescription of the
adjustment process and chooses a strategy at random. Following the previously received liter-
ature, we call such unintentional choices trembles, mistakes or mutations. If " = 0 we obtain
a best-reply process without mistakes, called the unperturbed process. We refer to the process
with mistakes as the perturbed process.
The process de¯ned above gives rise to a ¯nite state time{homogenous Markov chain with
stationary transition probabilities. We are interested in the limit invariant distribution of the
perturbed process as the probability of mistakes tends to zero. In the following we give a brief
summary of the techniques employed in the main section of the paper.11
2.3 Review of Techniques
An absorbing set of the unperturbed process is a minimal subset, in the sense of set inclusion,
of states which, once entered, is never abandoned. An absorbing state is a singleton absorbing
set. States that are not in any absorbing set are called transient.
Every absorbing set of a Markov chain induces an invariant distribution, i.e. a distribution
over states ¹ 2 ¢(­) which, if taken as initial condition, is reproduced in probabilistic terms
in the next period, i.e. ¹ ¢ P = ¹. The invariant distribution induced by an absorbing set W
has support W. Since experiments make transitions between any two states possible, under the
perturbed process the only absorbing set is the whole state space (i.e. the perturbed process
is irreducible and aperiodic). We denote the (unique) invariant distribution of the perturbed
process by ¹(").
The limit invariant distribution (as the rate of experimentation tends to zero) ¹¤ = lim"!0 ¹(")
exists and is an invariant distribution of the unperturbed process P (see e.g. Freidlin and Wentzell
(1988), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993), or Ellison (2000)). It singles out a sta-
ble prediction of the original process, in the sense that, for any " small enough, the play approxi-
mates that described by ¹¤ in the long run. The states in the support of ¹¤, f! 2 ­ j ¹¤(!) > 0g
9In this sense agents do not attempt to conduct a forecast of future behavior but rather base their decision
on the current pattern of play.
10Note that unlike the process de¯ned in Jackson and Watts (2002) in our setup agents may choose the action
in the base game and decide on their links at the same time.
11For textbook treatments of these concepts see e.g. Samuelson (1997), Young (1998), or Sandholm (2009).
7are called Long Run Equilibria (LRE) or stochastically stable states. The set of stochastically
stable states is a union of absorbing sets of the unperturbed process P.
Ellison (2000) presents a powerful method to determine the set of LRE which is based on
a characterization by Freidlin and Wentzell (1988). Let X and Y be two absorbing sets and
let c(X;Y ) > 0 be the minimal number of mistakes needed for a direct transition from X to
Y (i.e. the cost of transition). De¯ne a path from X to Y as a ¯nite sequence of absorbing
sets P = fX = S0;:::;SK = Y g and let S(X;Y ) be the set of paths from X to Y . Given
a path P, de¯ne its length l(P) as the number of elements of the sequence minus 1, so that





The minimal number of mistakes required for a (possibly indirect) transition from X to Y
C(X;Y ) = min
P2S(X;Y )
c(P):
The Radius of an absorbing set X is de¯ned as
R(X) = minfC(X;Y )jY is an absorbing set, Y 6= Xg,
i.e. the minimal number of mistakes needed to leave X. The coradius of X is de¯ned as
CR(X) = maxfC(Y;X)jY is an absorbing set, Y 6= Xg,
i.e. the maximal number of mistakes needed to reach X. Ellison (2000) shows that
Lemma 1. (Ellison 2000). If R(X) > CR(X) the only long run equilibria (LRE) are contained
in X.
Note that R(X) > CR(X) simply expresses the idea that for X to be LRE X should be
easier to reach than to leave by simultaneous mutations.
3 Network Formation and Social Coordination
As a benchmark, we will ¯rst consider a scenario where the costs of link formation are linear
in the number of links and players may initiate all links, similar to the model of Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2005). We will then move on to discuss a scenario where each agent may only
have a limited number of links. Before we begin with our main analysis of these two scenarios
we will however devote some more time to a discussion of the best response of an agent when
actions and links may be adjusted at the same time.
83.1 Link Optimized Payo®s and Optimal Actions
Note that in our model agents may choose both their actions and the set of agents they want
to link up to at the same time. Consequently, when analyzing under which conditions an agent
will choose a particular action one has to take into account her optimal linking decision. The
decision procedure can therefore be split in two parts: First, to determine the optimal set of
links for both actions, A and B given the distribution of play in the population. And second,
to decide which of the two actions to play, given the optimal set of links. We solve the ¯rst part
of this problem by introducing the concept of a link optimized payo® function, for short LOP.
The LOP, which we denote by vi(ai;n(s)), of an agent i using action ai 2 fA;Bg is given by
the maximally attainable payo® when linking up to other agents given that n(s) agents play A




Given the optimal set of links for agent i, we can then solve the second part of our problem,
which consists of ¯nding the optimal action. Here, we follow Sandholm (1998) and consider the
following best response rule which takes into account that agent i's decision today will in°uence
tomorrow's distribution of play.12
² If ai = A switch to B if vi(B;n(s) ¡ 1) > vi(A;n(s)). Otherwise stay with A.
² If ai = B switch to A if vi(A;n(s) + 1) > vi(B;n(s)). Otherwise stay with B.
As mentioned above, we assume that eventual ties are broken at random.
3.2 Unconstrained Interactions
In the ¯rst scenario, we consider the case where the cost of linking to di other agents is given by
Á(di) = ·di with · ¸ 0. As we are interested in situations where there is a con°ict between the
two conventions, we focus on cases where the cost of forming links is smaller than the smallest
of the two equilibrium payo®s of the base game, i.e. · · a.13 In the linking decision of the
agents the magnitude of the linking cost will turn out to play a crucial role. For relatively low
linking costs (0 · · · d) agents wish to form all links to all other agents regardless of the action
they are choosing in the base game. For intermediate linking cost (d · · · c), A-players will
still link up to all other agents regardless of their strategy whereas B-players only wish to link
up to agents of their own kind. And for high linking costs, c · · · a, agents only want to link
12Kandori, Mailath, and Rob's (1993) original process was actually based on imitation.
13If a < · · b it will only pay o® for B-players to form links to other B-players. Hence, in this scenario the
fully connected network where everybody chooses B and the empty network where everybody chooses A are the
only Nash equilibria. Note that as the latter can be upset with only mutation to B the former will be LRE. If
· > b no links will form and every action con¯guration where no links has formed is a Nash equilibrium.
9up to other agents of their own kind and interaction between groups choosing di®erent actions
is completely shut down. Consequently, the LOPs of an A-agent and a B-agent are given by
v(A;n) = [a ¡ ·]+(n ¡ 1) + [c ¡ ·]+(N ¡ n)
v(B;n) = [d ¡ ·]+n + [b ¡ ·]+(N ¡ n ¡ 1)
where [x]+ = maxf0;xg.
We denote by
¡ !
A the state where everybody chooses action A and the network is complete,
i.e. all possible links are present, i.e.
¡ !
A = fs 2 Sjai = A and di = N ¡ 1 8i 2 Ig. Like-
wise
¡ !
B denotes the complete monomorphic network where everybody chooses action B, i.e.
¡ !
B = fs 2 Sjai = B and di = N ¡ 1 8i 2 Ig. Our ¯rst result is the following.




B are the only Nash equilibria. Further,





Proof. The proof proceeds by considering the low cost-, the intermediate cost-, and the high
cost scenario in turn.
i) Suppose 0 · · · d. In this case all links will form and we essentially obtain a scenario of
global interactions just as in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993). An A-player will switch to B
if
(n ¡ 1)d + (N ¡ n)b ¡ (N ¡ 1)· ¸ (n ¡ 1)a + (N ¡ n)c ¡ (N ¡ 1)·:
Solving for n yields that an A-player will switch to B if
n · (N ¡ 1)q¤ + 1 (1)
and will keep on using A otherwise. A B-player will switch to A if
na + (N ¡ n ¡ 1)c ¡ (N ¡ 1)· ¸ nd + (N ¡ n ¡ 1)b ¡ (N ¡ 1)·
i.e. if
n ¸ (N ¡ 1)q¤: (2)
and will remain a B-player otherwise.
ii) Now assume that d < · < c. In this case A-players want to link to all other players,
whereas B-players only want to link up to other B-players. An A-player will switch to B if and
only if
(N ¡ n)b ¡ (N ¡ n)· ¸ (n ¡ 1)a + (N ¡ n)c ¡ (N ¡ 1)·
i.e. if




a ¡ c + b ¡ ·
:
Note that since · > d we have q0 > q¤, i.e. if B-players do not link to A-players, then it requires
more A-players for A to be a best response as in the previous scenario. Likewise, one can show
that B-players will switch to A if
n ¸ (N ¡ 1)q0 + 1 (4)
iii) If c · · · a both A- and B-players will only link to agents of their own kind. Here an
A-player will switch to B if
(N ¡ n)b ¡ (N ¡ n)· ¸ (n ¡ 1)a ¡ (n ¡ 1)·:
if we denote by
q00 =
b ¡ ·
a + b ¡ 2·
(with q00 > 1
2 > q¤) the previous inequality translates into
n · (N ¡ 1)q00 + 1: (5)
Likewise it can be shown that a B-player will switch to A if
n ¸ (N ¡ 1)q00: (6)
To see that in all three scenarios the unperturbed process converges to either of the two
complete monomorphic networks consider an arbitrary state with n 2 f1;N ¡ 1g A-players. In
all three scenarios, (by (1) and (2) in the low cost scenario, by (3) and (4) in the intermediate
cost scenario, and by (5) and (6) in the high cost scenario) we have that if an agent prefers to
stick to her action all agents using the other action will switch. Assume an A-player is presented
with the opportunity to revise her strategy. We know that if she decides to stick with her action
then i) all other A agents will also stick with their action as they have the same LOP and ii)
all B agents will follow. On the contrary, assume that our A-player has decided to switch.
As before, this implies that all other A-players o®ered revision opportunity will also switch.
Further, for a su±ciently large population (such that the best response regions do not overlap)
also B-player will stick to their action. It follows that for a large enough population the process





With the help of the previous lemma we are able to prove the following proposition:
Theorem 1. In the unconstrained links scenario for a large enough population:
a) for low linking costs, 0 · · · d,
¡ !
A is LRE.
11b) for intermediate linking costs, d · · · c,
¡ !
A is LRE if
· < a + c ¡ b
and
¡ !
B is LRE otherwise.
c) for high linking costs, c · · · a,
¡ !
B is LRE.
Proof. First, consider the case when 0 · · · d. In order to move from the state
¡ !
B into
the basin of attraction of
¡ !





A) = d(N ¡ 1)q¤e.14 Likewise, in order to move from
¡ !
A into the basin of
attraction of the e±cient complete network,
¡ !
B at least dN ¡(N ¡1)q¤¡1e = d(N ¡1)(1¡q¤)e




B) = d(N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q¤)e . For large




A) as q¤ < 1













B) = d(N ¡ 1)(1 ¡ q0)e. Reconsidering q0 reveals that
q0 > 1
2 if · > a + c ¡ b and that q0 < 1
2 otherwise. Hence, for · < a + c ¡ b the risk dominant
complete network is unique LRE and for · > a + c ¡ b the e±cient complete network is unique
LRE









B) = d(N ¡1)(1¡q00)e. As q00 > 1
2 the e±cient complete network is uniquely selected. ¥
Taking a closer look at the conditions identi¯ed in Theorem 1 and noting that, by assumption,
d < c < a and a+c > d+b, we have that if · < a+c¡b the risk dominant convention is selected
and if · > a+c¡b the e±cient convention is selected. The main reason behind this result is that
if costs are low agents obtain a positive payo® from linking to other agents irrespective of their
action. Hence, the complete network will always form and we obtain global interaction where
the risk dominant strategy is uniquely selected due to the standard uncertainty considerations.
If however costs of forming links are high the agents do not wish to form all links anymore,
which gives the e±cient strategy a decisive advantage.
3.3 Constrained Interactions
We now turn to a scenario where each agent may only support a limited number of links. We
model this situation by assuming that the costs of links exceed the largest payo® in the base
14Where dxe denotes the smallest integer larger than x.
12game once a certain number of k < N ¡ 1 links have been established.15 Formally,




· if di · k
¹ · otherwise:
with Á(0) = 0, · · a, and ¹ · > b. Note that this implies that in equilibrium every player will
maximally support k links. It will turn out that considering this setup will signi¯cantly alter
the results as compared to the unconstrained link scenario.
In the following we denote by
¡ !
A[k] = fs 2 Sjai = A and di = k 8i 2 Ig the set of states
where all agents choose action A and each agent supports k links.
¡ !
B[k] is de¯ned in the same
way.
Consider ¯rst the case of low linking costs, 0 · · · d. In this scenario agents will ¯rst
connect to other agents of their own kind and will only then ¯ll up the remaining slots with
agents using di®erent actions. Consequently, the LOPs of an A-player and of a B-player, when
confronted with a distribution of play (n;N ¡ n), are given by
v(A;n) = aminfk;n ¡ 1g + c(k ¡ minfk;n ¡ 1g) ¡ ·k
v(B;n) = bminfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g + d(k ¡ minfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g) ¡ ·k:
For intermediate linking costs, d · · · c, B-players will only link up to other B-players whereas
A- player will ¯rst link up to all other A-players and will then also link up to B-players, yielding
v(A;n) = aminfk;n ¡ 1g + c(k ¡ minfk;n ¡ 1g) ¡ ·k
v(B;n) = (b ¡ ·)minfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g:
For high linking costs d · · · c agents will only interact with agents using the same action and
we obtain
v(A;n) = (a ¡ ·)minfk;n ¡ 1g
v(B;n) = (b ¡ ·)minfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g:
We can nest the low-, the intermediate, and the high- cost scenario in the following LOPs.
v(A;n) = [a ¡ ·]+ minfk;n ¡ 1g + [c ¡ ·]+(k ¡ minfk;n ¡ 1g)
v(B;n) = [b ¡ ·]+ minfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g + [d ¡ ·]+(k ¡ minfk;N ¡ n ¡ 1g)




B[k] are the only
Nash equilibria. Further, from any other state the process converges to either the absorbing set
15The unconstrained links scenario corresponds to the case where k = N ¡ 1.
13¡ !
A[k] or the absorbing set
¡ !
B[k].
Proof. In a ¯rst step, we will provide thresholds when an A-player will switch to B and thresh-
olds when a B-player will switch to A for the the low, the intermediate-, and the high- cost
scenario. Depending on the relationship between n, N, and k, we have to analyze four subcases
for each of these scenarios.16 For each of these 12 cases we have to identify conditions on the
distribution of play in the population, (n;N ¡n), under which an A-player will switch to B, i.e.
when v(B;n ¡ 1) ¸ v(A;n), and conditions under which a B-player will switch to A, i.e. when
v(A;n+1) > v(B;n). We report our ¯ndings in Table 1 and have relegated the straightforward
derivation of these thresholds into the appendix.
Switching thresholds for A-players
v(B;n ¡ 1) > v(A;n) k ¸ n ¡ 1 k ¸ n ¡ 1 k < n ¡ 1 k < n ¡ 1
k ¸ N ¡ n k < N ¡ n k ¸ N ¡ n k < N ¡ n
0 · · · d n < (N ¡ 1)q¤ + f(k;d) + 1 a:s: n < N ¡ a¡d
b¡dk a:s:
d < · · c n < (N ¡ 1)q0 + f(k;·) + 1 a:s: n < N ¡ a¡·
b¡·k a:s:
c < · · a n < (N ¡ 1)q00 + 1 a:s: n < N ¡ a¡·
b¡·k a:s:
Switching thresholds for B-players
v(A;n + 1) > v(B;n) k ¸ n k ¸ n k < n k < n
k ¸ N ¡ n ¡ 1 k < N ¡ n ¡ 1 k ¸ N ¡ n ¡ 1 k < N ¡ n ¡ 1
0 · · · d n > (N ¡ 1)q¤ + f(k;d) n:s n > N ¡ 1 ¡ a¡d
b¡dk n:s:
d < · · c n > (N ¡ 1)q0 + f(k;·) n:s n > N ¡ 1 ¡ a¡·
b¡·k n:s:
c < · · a n > (N ¡ 1)q00 n:s n > N ¡ 1 ¡ a¡·
b¡·k n:s:
Table 1: Where f(k;x) ´
(N¡k¡1)(c¡x)
(a¡c+b¡x) , \a.s." means that an A-player always switches to B,
and \n.s." means that a B-player never switches to A.
In each of the above cases, we ¯nd that if it is optimal for an agent to remain at her action
then it is optimal for players using a di®erent action to switch. For a large enough population,
the best response regions of the two actions do not overlap and we have that if it is optimal for
an agent to switch actions then it is also optimal for an agent with the other action to remain.
Now, note that in situations where everybody chooses the same action all agents will support




B[k]. Further, note that




B[k] the process will converge to either the set
¡ !
A[k] or the set
¡ !
B[k].
Finally, note that under our best response process ties are broken randomly. As agents do not
care about the identity of their opponents they are indi®erent between having links to, say,
16In the ¯rst subcase, with k ¸ n ¡ 1 and k ¸ N ¡ n neither A- nor B- players may ¯ll not all their slots
with agents of their own kind. In the low cost case they will ¯ll them up with agents of the other kind. In the
intermediate case, A-agents will ¯ll them up and B agents leave them empty and in the high cost case A- and
B-players leave them empty. In the second scenario, we have k ¸ n ¡ 1 and k · N ¡ n implying that A-players
do not ¯nd enough A-players to ¯ll up all their slots whereas B-players can ¯ll up all their slots with other
B-players. In the low and intermediate cost case A-players will ¯ll up the remaining slots with B-players whereas
in the high cost scenario they will leave them empty. In the third case, with k · n¡1 and k ¸ N ¡n, A-players
will link only to other A players whereas B-players can not ¯ll up all their slots with agents choosing the same
action. In the low cost scenario they will also link up to B-players whereas in the intermediate- and high- cost
scenario they will leave them empty. In the remaining case,with k · n¡1 and k · N ¡n both A- and B- players
will link up only to agents of their own kind.
14agent i and agent j. It follows that for each pair of states s;s0 2
¡ !
A[k] (and also for pair in
¡ !
B[k]) that there is positive probability of moving from s to s0 without mistakes, i.e. all states
in
¡ !
A[k] (and all sates in
¡ !
B[k]) form an absorbing set.
¥
We are now able to state our main theorem which characterizes the set of long run equilibria
in the constrained link scenario.
Theorem 2. In the constrained links scenario for a large enough population:
a) for low linking costs 0 · · · d the set
¡ !












A[k] is LRE otherwise,
b) for intermediate linking costs d · · < c the set
¡ !












A[k] is LRE otherwise,
c) for high linking costs c · · · a the set
¡ !
B[k] is LRE.
Proof. Using the switching thresholds reported in Table 1 we can study the low-, the intermediate-,
and the high- cost scenario in turn. First, consider the low cost scenario 0 · · · d and the set
¡ !
A[k]. Depending on whether A-players will link up to only A-players or to both kinds of players
after the mutations have occurred we distinguish two cases. In the ¯rst case, after the mutations
have occurred A-players will only link up to other A-players, i.e. k · n¡1. In this case, once we
have less than dN¡ a¡d
b¡dke A-players, A-players given revision opportunity will switch to B. This
requires da¡d










A[k] we need at least dN ¡1¡ a¡d
b¡dke agents to mutate




A[k]) = dN ¡ 1 ¡ a¡d










Let us now consider the question when it can be the case that after the mutations have occurred
A-players only link up to other A-players, i.e.





k · (N ¡ 1)
b ¡ d
a + b ¡ 2d
(10)
Note that once the previous inequality is ful¯lled also inequality (9) holds, implying that if after




Let us now consider the case when after the mutations have occurred there are not su±ciently
many A-players to ¯ll up all slots and A-players will link up to both kinds of players, i.e.









A[k]) = d(N ¡ 1)q¤ + f(k;d)e. Now the set
¡ !
B[k] is LRE if (7) holds and the
set
¡ !
A[k] is LRE otherwise.
Consider now the intermediate cost case with d · · · c. Here B- players will only link up
to agents of their own kind whereas A-players may still link up to agents of both kinds. Again,
to move into the basin of attraction of
¡ !
B[k] we need less (or equal) than k players to mutate
to B. As above, we distinguish two cases: In the ¯rst case, k · n¡1, after the mutations have
occurred A-players can ¯ll up all their slots with other A-players whereas in the second case,
k ¸ n¡1, A-players will also connect to B-players. Consider ¯rst the case where k · n¡1 and
the set
¡ !
A[k]: In order to move into the basin of attraction of
¡ !
B[k] at least da¡·
b¡·ke agents have to










requires at least dN ¡1¡ a¡·




A[k]) = dN ¡1¡ a¡·
b¡·ke.
Consequently, all states in
¡ !







As in the low cost case, we check when it can be the case that after the mutations A-players
will only link up to agents of their own kind, i.e.




Rearranging terms we arrive at the following inequality.
k · (N ¡ 1)
b ¡ ·
a + b ¡ 2·
(12)
Note that if the previous inequality holds also inequality (11) holds. Hence, if after the necessary
number of mutations have occurred A-players will link up to only A-players and
¡ !
B[k] is LRE.
Let us now consider the case when after the mutations have taken place A-players link up to









A[k]) = d(N ¡1)q0+f(k;d)e. Now
the set
¡ !
B[k] is LRE if (8) holds and the set
¡ !
A[k] is LRE otherwise.
16Finally, consider the high cost scenario, c · · · a. Now all agents only wish to link up to
other agents of their own kind. First, consider the case, when A-players ¯ll up all their slots
after the mutations, k · n ¡ 1. As A-players only connect to A-players this is essentially the










A[k]) = dN ¡ 1 ¡ a¡·
b¡·ke. Consequently, the set
¡ !







As in the intermediate cost case we ¯nd that A-players will ¯ll up all their slots provided that
k · (N ¡ 1)
b ¡ ·
a + b ¡ 2·
:




Consider now the case when after the mutations have occurred both A- and B- players









A[k]) = (N ¡ 1)q00. As q00 > 1
2 the set
¡ !
B[k] is LRE in this
case.
¥
The intuition behind this result is the following: If agents may only support a limited number
of connections agents will ¯rst try to ¯ll up their slots with agents using the same action as
they do. If the number of available links is relatively small already a small number of agents
using the e±cient action will cause other agents to switch to the e±cient action. Upsetting the
e±cient convention is also harder (as compared to the unconstrained interactions scenario) as
the e±cient action may spread back from relatively small subgroups using it.










As b > a, c > d and a + c > b + d we have that b¡a
c¡d + 1 2 (1;2) implying that (7) holds if
k < N¡1
2 . This implies that if agents only may support links to less than half of the population
we will always observe e±cient outcomes in the long run. This is in sharp contrast to the
results obtained in the unconstrained links scenario where the risk dominant convention is
always selected for low linking costs. Likewise, in the case of intermediate linking costs (8)
holds for k < N¡1
2 . Hence, also in the intermediate cost case we will observe coordination at
the e±cient action if agents may only interact with less than half of the population.
In Figure 1 we plot the parameter combinations under which either of the two conventions
17is LRE for general linking costs 0 · ·a and 1 · k · N ¡ 1 permitted links. Note that the
right border of ¯gure 1 corresponds to the unconstrained interaction scenario. In contrast to
this unconstrained interaction case the e±cient convention is selected for a quite large range
of parameter combinations. Further, note that for each level of linking costs · there exists a
number of permitted links k such that the e±cient convention is selected.
Figure 1: LRE in the game [a;c;d;b] = [4;3;1;5] with N = 101.
It might be tempting to think that a population of agents can be made better o® by con-
straining the maximal number of allowed links. For instance, consider a benevolent \network
designer" who can in°uence the maximally allowed number of links and seeks to maximize
agents utility in the long run equilibrium. Clearly, as B is the e±cient action it earns a higher
per interaction payo® to agents than A does. However, if one was to constrain interaction in
order to achieve coordination at the e±cient equilibrium, there will also be fewer interaction
per agents. So it would only pay o® to constrain the number of maximally allowed interactions
if
(b ¡ ·)k¤ > (a ¡ ·)(N ¡ 1) (14)
where k¤ is the integer k that ful¯lls (7) in the low linking cost scenario (respectively (8) in






b ¡ a + c ¡ d





b ¡ a + c ¡ ·
18in the intermediate linking cost scenario. The following example highlights that the welfare
e®ects of constraining interactions are ambiguous.










In the game u we have k¤ = 75. In the LRE under unconstrained interactions agents would earn
a payo® of a(N ¡ 1) = 400. In the constrained scenario (with k = 75) they could maximally
earn bk = 375. Thus agents are better o® in the unconstrained scenario. Now consider the
game ~ u. Here we have that k¤ = 90. In the unconstrained links scenario agents earn 700.
However, in the constrained links scenario (with k = 90) they would earn 990. In fact, it can
be veri¯ed from equation (14) that agents would be better o® under constrained interactions
for any k¤ 2 [63;90].
Thus, whether agents are better o® under constrained interactions or unconstrained interac-
tions depends on the particular nature of the game.
4 Extensions
4.1 Convex Linking Costs
We now consider an extension where linking cost functions are convex in the number of links
supported by an agent. It will turn out that this formulation automatically leads to a version




The parameter ¯ ¸ 0 sets an upper bound on the number of links an individuals will want to
support in equilibrium. Further, we assume ¯ · a, so that agents will (regardless of their action
choice) support at least one link.17
We are interested in an optimal linking strategy, de¯ning the optimal number of A- and B-
links an agent will want to form, given his own strategy ai and the global action pro¯le (n;N¡n).
Let us denote by ~ d¤
A(n) := (d¤
AjA(n);d¤
AjB(n)) the optimal linking strategy for A-players and by
~ d¤
B(n) the optimal linking strategy for B-players, given the action distribution (n;N ¡n). The
following Lemma characterizes these optimal linking strategies for A- and B-players.
Lemma 4. In the convex linking cost scenario the optimal linking strategies for A and B players
17If b · ¯ < a only B agents will link to other B agents and consequently the e±cient convention is the unique
LRE. Further, if ¯ < b no agent will have an incentive to form a link.
19are given by:
d¤
AjA(n) = minfna(¯);n ¡ 1g; d¤
AjB(n) = min
©






n;[n + 1 ¡ nd(¯)]+
ª
; d¤























Proof. We only provide the derivation for A-players and remark that the optimal linking strate-
gies of B-players can be derived analogously. An A-player who links to dAjA other A-players
and to dAjB B-players will obtain a payo® of
Ui((A;~ gi);s¡i) = adAjA + cdAjB ¡ ¯d2
A;
where dA = dAjA + dAjB. First, note that as a > c, A-players will ¯rst establish links to other
A-players and will only then consider linking to B-players. If there are n A-players the optimal
number of A links d¤
AjA(n) has to be such that creating an additional link will not increase the




dAjA 2 f0;1;:::;n ¡ 1g
¯ ¯












= minfna(¯);n ¡ 1g:
Now, let's consider the question how many links an A-player will establish to B-players. As in
the previous case, the optimal number of links an A-player establishes to B-players has to be
such that creating an additional link will not increase his utility. Hence, we are searching for
the largest integer dAjB 2 f0;1;2;:::;N ¡ ng that satis¯es
c(dAjB + 1) ¡ ¯(d¤
AjA(n) + dAjB + 1)2 ¡ cdAjB + ¯(d¤
AjA(n) + dAjB)2 ¸ 0:
Note that nc(¯) ¡ d¤
AjA(n) is the largest dAjB that ful¯lls this inequality. Taking into account






























, and consequently d¤
AjB(n) = 0. Hence, the
20optimal number of B links for an A-player, d¤








This Lemma completely characterizes the structure of equilibrium networks, given the dis-
tribution of actions (n;N ¡ n). We now move on to discuss which action will be adopted by









Consider ¯rst the optimal linking strategy for an A-player. Note that if na(¯) ¸ N ¡ 1, or
equivalently ¯ < a
2N¡1, an A-player will establish all links with other A-players, i.e.
d¤
AjA(n) = n ¡ 1 8n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng:
For ¯ ¸ a





n ¡ 1 if n 2 f1;2;:::;na(¯)g;
na(¯) if n 2 fna(¯) + 1;:::;Ng:
Hence, once there are more than na(¯) A-players in the population A-players will not have an
incentive to support more connections to other A-players than na(¯). Now consider the question
how many links an A-player will establish to B-players. If ¯ < c
2N¡1 A-players wish to link up
to all B-players, i.e.
d¤
AjB(n) = N ¡ n 8n 2 f1;2;:::;N ¡ 1g:
If nc(¯) < N ¡ 1, A-players may not wish to establish links to all other B-players and we have




nc(¯) ¡ (n ¡ 1) if n 2 f1;:::;nc(¯)g;
0 if n 2 fnc(¯) + 1;:::;Ng:
Hence, an A-players will only link up to B players if there are less than nc(¯) A-players. Now,
let us consider the optimal linking strategy of B-players. If ¯ < b
2N¡1, B-players wish to form
all links to other B-players and we have that
d¤
BjB(n) = N ¡ n ¡ 1; 8n 2 f0;1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
21If ¯ ¸ b




N ¡ nb(¯) if n 2 f0;1;:::;nb(¯) ¡ 1g;
N ¡ n ¡ 1 if n 2 fnb(¯);:::;Ng
Let us now turn to the question how many links a B-player will establish to A- players. For
¯ < d
2N¡1 we have that a B-player will link up to all other A-players, i.e.
d¤
BjA(n) = n; 8n 2 f0;1;:::;N ¡ 1g;
and for ¯ ¸ d




0 if n 2 f0;1;:::;nd(¯) ¡ 1g;
n + 1 ¡ nd(¯) if n 2 fnd(¯);:::;Ng:
We are now able to state our ¯rst result for the convex linking cost scenario.
Proposition 5. In the convex linking cost scenario, for 0 · ¯ · d
2N¡1,
¡ !
A is the unique LRE.
Proof. Note that for ¯ · d
2N¡1 all agents wish link up to to all other agents regardless of their
action choice. Thus, we essentially have a global interactions model and it follows from Theorem
1 that
¡ !
A is unique LRE. ¥
The main reason behind this result is that low values of ¯ do not in°uence the interaction
pattern of agents, implying that we are back in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob's (1993) model of
global interactions where the risk dominant convention is selected.
We will focus on situations where the linking cost in°uences the interaction pattern of agents,
i.e. we consider ¯ > d






a(n ¡ 1) + c(nc(¯) ¡ (n ¡ 1)) ¡ ¯nc(¯)2 if n 2 f1;2;:::;nc(¯)g;
a(n ¡ 1) ¡ ¯(n ¡ 1)2 if n 2 fnc(¯) + 1;:::;na(¯)g;
ana(¯) ¡ ¯na(¯)2 if n 2 fna(¯) + 1;:::;Ng:
Note that, by de¯nition of the thresholds nc(¯) and na(¯), we have that v(A;¢) > 0 and that
the LOP is a non-decreasing function of n. Further, we see that once there are more than na(¯)






b(N ¡ nb(¯)) ¡ ¯(N ¡ nb(¯))2 if n 2 f0;1;:::;nb(¯) ¡ 1g;
b(N ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ ¯(N ¡ n ¡ 1)2 if n 2 fnb(¯);:::;nd(¯) ¡ 1g;
b(N ¡ n ¡ 1) + d(n + 1 ¡ nd(¯)) ¡ ¯(N ¡ nd(¯))2 if n 2 fnd(¯);:::;N ¡ 1g:
22As above, it follows by the de¯nitions of the thresholds nd(¯) and nb(¯) that v(B;¢) > 0 and
that the LOP is non-increasing in n. Once there are strictly less than nb(¯) A-players, the
group of B-players will only interact with other B-players.
In the following, we denote by ~ A[d¤
A(N)] the set of states where everybody chooses action A
and has established d¤
A(N) links, i.e.
~ A[d¤
A(N)] = fs 2 Sjai = A; and ~ d¤
i(N) = ~ d¤
A(N) 8i 2 Ig:
The set ~ B[d¤
B(0)] is de¯ned accordingly as,
~ B[d¤
B(0)] = fs 2 Sjai = B; and ~ d¤
i(0) = ~ d¤
B(0) 8i 2 Ig:
Proposition 6. In the convex linking cost scenario, for ¯ > b
N, the set ~ B[d¤
B(0)] is the unique
LRE.
Proof. If ¯ > b
N we have that nb(¯) > N+1
2 and na(¯) < N¡1
2 . Hence, the maximal value of the
LOP of an A-player is attained at a point below N¡1
2 . For any n ¸ na(¯) it is constant (at its
maximal value) and given by





















The LOP function for action B is constant at its maximal value for n · nb(¯) and given by





















Note that since b > a we have that v¤(B) > v¤(A), i.e. B-players earn a higher maximum
payo® than A-players (as expected). Consequently, once there are more than N ¡ nb(¯) B-
players all agents given revision opportunity will either remain at B or switch to A, establishing
CR(~ B[d¤(0)]) · N ¡nb(¯) < (N ¡1)=2. Conversely, to leave the basin of attraction of ~ B[d¤(0)]
we need more than nb(¯) B-agents to switch from B to A, establishing R(~ B[d¤
B(0)]) ¸ nb(¯) >
(N + 1)=2. ¥
The main intuition behind this result is that for su±ciently high linking costs agent do not
wish to form all links allowing the e±cient agents to play out its advantage. We remark that,
in contrast to the constrained linking scenario, in the convex linking cost scenario the number
of links agents support in equilibrium arises endogenously. Even though we have provided a
partial characterization of the set of LRE in the convex linking scenario it seems to us that
is very di±cult to obtain a full characterization of the set of LRE for ¯ 2 [ d
2N¡1; b
N]. We are
however able to provide the following result for a particular class of coordination games.
23Proposition 7. Suppose the base game payo®s satisfy the ordering d
c > a+d¡b




(a) There exists an "A > 0 so that for all ¯ 2 ( d
2N¡1; d
2N¡1 + ±) and ± 2 (0;"A(N)), the set
¡ !
A[d¤
A(N)] is the unique LRE for N su±ciently large.
(b) There exists an "B > 0 so that for all ¯ 2 ( c
2N¡1 ¡ ±; c
2N¡1] and ± 2 (0;"B(N)), the set
¡ !
B[d¤
B(0)] is the unique LRE for N su±ciently large.
Proof. We want to assess when an A-player will switch to B and when B-players will not switch
to A. So, we are searching for two thresholds n¤
1(¯) and n¤
2(¯), such that

























We are seeking for a solution of the thresholds n¤
1(¯);n¤
2(¯) in the range fnd(¯);:::;N ¡1g and
¯ 2 ( d
2N¡1; c
2N¡1). These two numbers will give us accurate values of the radius and coradius




A(N)]) = N ¡ n¤







For these values of marginal linking costs A-players wish to form links to everybody in the
population. Consequently, the LOP of an A-player is given by
v(A;n) = a(n ¡ 1) + c(N ¡ n) ¡ ¯(N ¡ 1)2:
If an A-player would switch to B he would calculate his payo®s according to the function
v(B;n ¡ 1) = b(N ¡ n) + d(n ¡ nd(¯)) ¡ ¯(N ¡ nd(¯))2:
One can show that v(B;n ¡ 1) ¸ v(A;n) if
n ·
»
a ¡ dnd(¯) + bN ¡ cN + ¯ ¡ nd(¯)2¯ ¡ 2N¯ + 2Nnd(¯)¯




It can be veri¯ed that n¤
1(¯) is increasing in ¯ and that n¤






d(N ¡1)q¤ +1e. Similarly, one can show that v(B;n) ¸ v(A;n+1), so that a B-player will not
switch to A, if
n ·
»
c + b(N ¡ 1) ¡ cN ¡ (nd(¯) ¡ 1)(d + ¯ + nd(¯)¯ ¡ 2N¯)





2(¯) is also increasing in ¯ and n¤
2(d=(2N ¡ 1)) = d(N ¡ 1)q¤e. We see that
n¤
1(d=2N ¡1) and n¤
2(d=2N ¡1) coincide with the points of separation of the basins of attraction
of the two equilibria found in the low costs scenario with unconstrained interactions, as it should
be in view of Proposition 5. From Theorem 1 we know that there is an N0 such that for all
N ¸ N0 the absorbing set with all agents playing A is the unique LRE. Fix such a population




1(d=(2N ¡ 1) + ±) + n¤
2(d=(2N ¡ 1) + ±) ¡ N · 0g:
For all ± < "A(N) the radius of
¡ !
A[d¤
A(N)] exceeds the coradius of the same set. Consequently,
we have that for all ± 2 (0;"A(N)) the set
¡ !
A[d¤
A(N)] is selected as unique LRE, which proves
part (a).










is an increasing function of ¯. Therefore we consider the value of the thresholds at the higher
cost level ¯ = c=(2N ¡ 1). Direct substititution and some algebraic manipulations gives us
n¤
1(c=2N ¡ 1) =
»
4ac ¡ d2 ¡ 3c2





2bc ¡ c2 ¡ 2cd + d2
2c(a + b ¡ c ¡ d)
:








1(c=(2N ¡ 1)) = d1 + (N ¡ 1)~ qe. Similarly, we obtain
n¤
2(c=2N ¡ 1) =
»
(c ¡ d)(c + d) ¡ 4c(b ¡ d)






4c(a+b¡c¡d) 2 (¡1;0) we get n¤
2(c=(2N ¡ 1)) = d(N ¡ 1)~ qe. Hence, for ¯ = c=(2N ¡ 1)
18That ~ q < 1 follows from the fact that
1 ¡ ~ q > 0 , 2ac > d
2 + c
2
which holds since a > c > d, and consequently 2ac = ac+ac > d
2+c
2. Moreover observe that 0 <
4ac¡d2¡3c2
4c(a+b¡c¡d) <
1 ¡ ~ q and consequently n
¤
1(c=(2N ¡ 1)) · 1 + (N ¡ 1)~ q. In fact, we have n
¤
1(c=(2N ¡ 1)) 2 [N~ q;1 + (N ¡ 1)~ q], so
that n
¤








B(0)]) = d(N ¡ 1)~ qe + d1 + (N ¡ 1)~ qe ¡ N > 0
for N su±ciently large so that (2~ q¡1)(N ¡1) ¸ 1 and ~ q > 1=2. Now we can invoke a continuity
argument; Pick N su±ciently large so that B[d¤




1(c=(2N ¡ 1) ¡ ±) + n¤
2(c=(2N ¡ 1) ¡ ±) ¡ N ¸ 0g:
It follows that for all ± 2 (0;"B(N)) and ¯ 2 ( c
2N¡1 ¡ ±; c




its coradius, and so this set will be the unique LRE. ¥
We remark that the proof of Proposition 7 relied on the piecewise de¯nition of the LOPs, and
that the case treated in the proposition is certainly not the only possible parameter constellation
for which the set ~ B[d¤
B(0)] is LRE. However, we think that a general characterization of the set
of LRE under convex linking costs is very di±cult to obtain and leave this question to further
research.
4.2 General m £ m Coordination Games
We will now discuss general m £ m strict symmetric coordination games. Although, it might
be di±cult to obtain a general characterization of the set of LRE as provided by Theorem 2
we are nevertheless able to provide su±cient conditions under which the e±cient convention is
LRE under the constrained interaction scenario outlined in Section 3.3.
The action set in the base game A = fa1;a2;:::;amg now contains m actions. We concentrate
on strict coordination games, i.e. (symmetric) games where coordination on any pure action is
a strict Nash equilibrium. Formally, u(a;a) > u(a0;a) for all a;a0 2 A with a 6= a0. Morris,
Rob, and Shin (1995) have introduced the concept of p-dominance which is a generalization of
risk dominance to m £ m games. An action a is said to be p-dominant if it is a best response
to any mixed action pro¯le ¾ with ¾(a) ¸ p.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the action a1 is payo® dominant, i.e. u(a1;a1) >
u(a;a) for all a 2 A. Further, we denote by p, the smallest probability weight for which a1 is
still a best response against any pro¯le with mass p on a1. Note that as (a1;a1) is a strict Nash
equilibrium we have that p < 1. We denote by ~ a1[k] = fs 2 Sjai = a1and di = k 8i 2 Ig the
set of states where everybody chooses action a1 and supports k links.
We are interested in two scenarios: In the ¯rst scenario the linking costs · are smaller than
all payo®s in the base game, i.e. · · u(a;a0) for all a;a0 2 A and in the second scenario the
linking costs are higher than the smallest payo® in the game but smaller than either of the
equilibrium payo®s, i.e. · > u(a;a0) for some a;a0 2 A and · · u(a;a) for all a 2 A. We are
26now able to state the following result.
Proposition 8. In the constrained links scenario for a large enough population:










Proof. First, consider the low linking cost case. Note that all agents will establish k links.
Further, note that the a1- agents will ¯rst establish links to other a1- agents and will only
then link to other agents. Now, note that a1 is a best response whenever there is a fraction
of p agents of the k permitted links adopting it. Consequently, we have that if pk agents use
action a1 agents using other actions will follow, establishing CR(¡ ! a 1[k]) · dpke. In order to
leave the basin of attraction of ¡ ! a 1[k] we need less than pk agents in the overall population to
adopt it, establishing R(¡ ! a 1[k]) ¸ dN ¡ 1 ¡ pke. Hence, for a large enough population we have
R(¡ ! a 1[k]) > CR(¡ ! a 1[k]) if (20) holds.
Second, consider the high linking cost case. Now certain interactions between groups of agents
using di®erent actions are shut down. However, as a1 is payo® dominant, we know that once we
have k agents adopting it all other agents will follow. Hence, CR(¡ ! a 1[k]) · k. Conversely, to
leave the basin of attraction of ¡ ! a 1[k] we at least need N ¡1¡k agents to mutate to something
else, establishing R(¡ ! a 1[k]) ¸ N ¡ 1 ¡ k. If (21) holds we have R(¡ ! a 1[k]) > CR(¡ ! a 1[k]). ¥
Note that the previous result holds also in the presence of alternative q-dominant even if
we consider q ! 0. Thus, in general coordination games payo® dominance remains the main
criterion for equilibrium selection under (su±ciently) constrained interactions.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model of social coordination and network formation where agents may
only support a limited number of links. In many cases, where agents would have been stuck in
risk dominant and possibly ine±cient conventions, constrained interactions allowes societies to
coordinate at e±cient convention. The main reason behind this result is that under constrained
interactions agents carefully have to decide on whom to establish one of their precious links to,
thereby giving the e±cient convention the decisive advantage.
We remark that in certain situations it might be more plausible that also the passive party
receives some payo® from the interaction, just as in the models by e.g. Jackson and Watts (2002)
27or Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005). Such an extension would however drastically complicate
the analysis. For, when deciding on their strategy agents will not only consider the action
distribution in the overall population but will also have to take into account the actions chosen
by the agents they are passively linked to. However, we think that also in this setup constrained
interactions might foster the emergence of e±cient convention but leave the analysis of this
scenario to future research.
6 Appendix
Derivation of the switching thresholds reported in Table 1
We only provide the computations for the switching thresholds of A-players. The switching
thresholds of B-players can be computed analogously.
Case 1 First, consider the case of low linking costs 0 · · · d. An A-player will switch to B if
aminfk;n ¡ 1g + c(k ¡ minfk;n ¡ 1g) > bminfk;N ¡ ng + d(k ¡ minfk;N ¡ ng)
Depending on the relationship between N, n, and k we obtain four subcases.
(1i) If k ¸ n ¡ 1 and k ¸ N ¡ n neither A nor B players may ¯ll up all their slots with
other agents of their own kind. An A-player will switch to B if
a(n ¡ 1) + c(k ¡ n + 1) · b(N ¡ n) + d(k ¡ N + n)
i.e. if




(1ii) If k ¸ n¡1 and k < N¡n, A-players do not ¯nd su±ciently many other A-players to
¯ll up all their slots whereas B-players can ¯ll up all their slots with other B-players.
As b is the highest payo® in the base game B-players will always earn the highest
payo® whenever they may ¯ll up all their slots, and so A-players always switch to
B.19
(1iii) If k < n ¡ 1 and k < N ¡ n, A-players will link only to other A players whereas
B-players can not ¯ll up all their slots with agents of their own kind. An A-player
will switch to B whenever
ak > b(N ¡ n) + d(k ¡ N + n)





k )c. On the right-hand side we have a convex combination in [c;a]. Since b > a ¸ c the claim
follows.
28i.e. if




(1iv) In the remaining case with k < n ¡ 1 and k < N ¡ n both A- and B- players will
link up only to agents of their own kind. Here we ¯nd that A-players always have an
incentive to switch to B.
Case 2 For intermediate linking costs d · · · c B-players will no longer interact with A-
players whereas A-players will still interact with B-players. Consequently, an A-player
will switch to B whenever
aminfk;n ¡ 1g + c(k ¡ minfk;n ¡ 1g) ¡ ·k > (b ¡ ·)minfk;N ¡ ng
Let us again consider our four subcases.
(2i) When k ¸ n ¡ 1 and k ¸ N ¡ n an A-player will switch to B if
n · (N ¡ 1)q0 + 1 + f(k;d):
(2ii) If k ¸ n¡1 and k < N ¡n there are su±ciently many B-players so that choosing B
always gives the highest payo®.
(2iii) Whenever k < n ¡ 1 and k ¸ N ¡ n, A-player will switch to B if




(2iv) If k < n ¡ 1 and k < N ¡ n then A-players as well as B-players can completely
isolate. Since the B-players earn always a higher payo®, all As will switch to B.
Case 3 Finally we consider the case of high linking costs c · · · a. In this case any interaction
between groups of agents choosing di®erent actions is completely shut down. In this
scenario, an A-player will switch to B whenever
(a ¡ ·)minfk;n ¡ 1g · (b ¡ ·)minfk;N ¡ ng:
(3i) If k ¸ n ¡ 1 and k ¸ N ¡ n we ¯nd that an A-player will switch to B if
n < (N ¡ 1)q00 + 1:
(3ii) The same applies as in cases (1ii) or (2ii).
29(3iii) A-players will switch to B whenever




(3iv) The same applies as in cases (1iv) or (2iv).
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